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Abstract 
 Studies of non-linear cobweb models have failed to address a fundamental issue: 
whether the complex dynamical behavior displayed by such models is consistent 
with the survival of producers. This paper shows that where borrowing is 
unconstrained, as is implicitly assumed in standard cobweb models, borrowing 
results in financial crises. Incorporating constraints on borrowing is needed to 
salvage cobweb models. Industry performance (in terms both of profitability and of 
the incidence of bankruptcies) is highly sensitive to the nature of such credit 
restrictions. 
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The Cobweb, Borrowing and Financial Crises  
1. Introduction 
Since their introduction in the 1930s to explain fluctuations in agricultural production and 
prices in terms of sequential production readjustments, cobweb models have played a pivotal 
role in developments in economic dynamics. In the standard model, firms in a competitive 
industry produce a single homogeneous product; there is a well-defined production period, 
with the producers’ activities being synchronized; producers base decisions on price 
expectations; and the market-clearing product price is established in tantaneously at the end 
of each period. With the sole inter-temporal link being via price expectations, particular 
attention has been devoted to their formation. Indeed, it was in the context of cobweb models 
that adaptive expectations, rational expectations, expectations based on the mean of all past 
prices and heterogeneous expectations were first analyzed. 
It is, however, curious and regrettable that in a context the very essence of which is that 
production takes time, very little attention has been paid to how producers finance their 
production activities and to the possibility of their becoming bankrupt. Typically it is 
assumed implicitly that producers can borrow or lend any amount at a given market rate of 
interest determined by the overall state of the economy. Certainly a ‘perfect’ financial capital 
market is a powerful simplification frequently invoked by economic theorists. In a cobweb 
model, it seemingly enables theorists to dispense with financial constraints on producer 
behavior and to concentrate on technological constraints. But it can be a very misleading 
simplification. Indeed, assuming that producers can borrow any amount at a given interest 
rate not only does not rule out bankruptcy but makes it particularly likely. Nor is bankruptcy 
ruled out by assuming that producers pay for inputs at the end of the production period. To 
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put the matter starkly, the possibility of bankruptcy is necessarily eliminated only if 
producers rely exclusively on their own financial capital to pay for inputs in advance.  
Section 2 sets out the assumptions of our model. Section 3 examines the case where 
producers can borrow or lend freely at a given interest rate. Looking beyond the usual 
treatment of the dynamical behavior of price reveals a fundamental problem: borrowing 
results in bankruptcy. However, this paper is not simply intended as a challenge to standard 
non-linear cobweb models. In Section 4, following a brief consideration of the case where 
firms rely exclusively on their own financial capital, we explore the implications of banks 
limiting what they are prepared to lend to producers. We examine the cases where borrowing 
limits depend on the values of durable assets available for use as collateral and where they 
depend on producers’ financial wealth levels. 
2.  Assumptions 
There are N units of a homogeneous durable asset, denoted by L, that is specific to the 
industry and in perfectly inelastic supply (akin to Ricardian land). Since the ownership and 
use of 1 (and only 1) unit of L is required for participation in the industry,1 there are, in any 
period, N producers, where N is sufficiently large so that each acts as if a price-taker for the 
product. Producers can acquire other inputs, but they must pay for these at the outset of the 
well-defined production period using their own financial capital, possibly supplemented by 
borrowed funds. At the beginning of period t (before entering into any commitments for the 
ensuing period), the representative firm’s total wealth is 
          t t tW F V= +  (1) 
                                               
1
 This asset could, for example, be land or a farm. With appropriate (re-)interpretations of what follows, it could 
be a transferable license or permit required for participating in the industry. 
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where tF  is its net financial wealth and 0tV ≥  is the market value of its unit of L. The firm’s 
output for the tth period is 
          
,t f v tq q q= +  (2) 
where 0fq >  is the output per period that would result from using solely its unit of L and 
where any extra output, 
,
0v tq ≥ , is achieved by the purchase of additional inputs. The cost 
function, which is invariant over time, is 
          ( ), ,v t v tc q qα=  (3) 
where 1α > , so marginal cost is increasing. The firm’s net borrowing for period t is  
          
,t v t tB q F
α
= −  (4) 
where Bt < 0 implies having bank deposits on which interest is received. The interest rate, r, 
on a loan for the duration of the production period is determined by the overall state of the 
economy and is invariant over time. The firms in the industry earn the same rate r on any 
bank deposits, so that r constitutes the marginal opportunity cost of the use of own funds in 
financing the production process.  
Producers are motivated by the accumulation of wealth. At the beginning of period t, 
subject to any financial capital constraint, the representative firm maximizes its expected 
financial wealth at the beginning of period ( )1t +  or, equivalently, maximizes its expected 
profit for period t. The firm’s expected price for the output of period t, etp , is based on 
adaptive expectations,  
          ( )1 1 1e e et t t tp p p pγ− − −= + −  (5) 
where 0 1γ< ≤  is the price expectations adjustment speed, with 1γ =  constituting naïve 
expectations. Expected profit for period t is 
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          ( )
,
1e et t t v tp q r q
αpi = − + . (6) 
This definition of expected profit allows for the opportunity cost of own funds used to 
finance production but does not take account of the opportunity cost of the funds tied up in 
ownership of L. Once the producer is committed to participation in the industry in the current 
period, the cost of ownership of L constitutes a sunk cost, and etpi  amounts to an expected 
quasi-rent accruing to the ownership of L.  
Output is sold at the end of the period. For simplicity, we assume that the total 
expenditure, E, on the product of this industry is given and invariant over time, implying a 
unit elastic product demand curve. The market-clearing price, established instantaneously, is 
          t
t
Ep
Nq
=  (7) 
so that ( )0 t fp p E Nq< ≤ ≡ . Since total revenue is invariant, the realized profit per firm is 
a strictly monotonically declining function of output:  
          ( ) ( )
, ,
1 1t t t v t v tp q r q r q
α αpi pi= − + = − +

 (8) 
where E Npi ≡  is the maximum profit achieved when each firm produces the minimum 
output fq . The firm’s income for period t is 
          t t ty rF pi= + . (9) 
Its financial wealth at the end of the period is 
          ( )1 1t t t t tF F y r F pi+ = + = + + . (10) 
The simplest assumption that captures the notion that the market value of 1 unit of L depends 
on the long-term profitability of its ownership is that it is given by the present value of the 
receipt in perpetuity of the mean of the representative producer’s past profits. That is,  
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          ( )1 0
1
1
t
tV
r t ττ
pi+
=
=
+
  (11) 
subject to 1 0tV + ≥ . The representative firm’s total wealth at the beginning of the next 
production cycle is then 1 1 1t t tW F V+ + += + . 
3. Unconstrained Borrowing 
Suppose initially that firms can borrow any amount at the going market interest rate. 
Maximizing expected profit requires that marginal cost equal the expected price: 
          ( ) 1
,
1 ev t tr q p
αα −+ = . (12) 
From (2) and (12), 
          ( ) 1 1, et f v t f tq q q q p α ψ−= + = +  (13) 
where ( ) 1 11 r αψ α − −= +   . Using (5), (7) and (13) yields the map f: 
          
( )1 1 1 11
( ) (1 )e e et t t
e
f t
Ep f p p
N q p α
γγ
ψ
− −
−
−
= = − +
 
+ 
 
. (14) 
Given an initial expected price 0
ep , the future time path of expected price is uniquely 
determined by (14). The time paths of tq , tp  and tpi  are determined uniquely from that of 
e
tp . With an appropriate initial condition, the time path of tV  can be determined from that of 
tpi . The decomposition that results from unconstrained borrowing means that the time paths 
of etp , tq , tp , tpi  and tV  do not depend on the initial financial wealth, 0F . In contrast, the 
time paths for tB , ty , tF , and tW  depend on 0F . 
A fixed point for the map f corresponds to a stationary state, where the representative 
producer is maximizing (expected) profit on the basis of a price expectation that is being 
Page 6 of 30 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 
6 
realized. The stationary values ( ), ,vp q q  satisfy (i) ep p= , (ii) 
1
1
f v fq q q q pα ψ−= + = + , 
and (iii) N q p E= . Fig. 1 shows p  and the corresponding industry output, N q . The 
stationary profit, ( )1 0vr qαpi pi= − + > , constitutes a return to the ownership of L. In a 
thorough-going stationary state, V rpi=  and pure profit (taking account of the opportunity 
cost of the wealth tied up in the ownership of L) is zero. In a stationary state, everything is 
stationary except for financial wealth, bank deposits and income. 
The fixed point is locally stable if ( )1 1f p′− < < , where ( )f p′  denotes the first 
derivative of f evaluated at the fixed point. Expressing it in terms of vq  and q  confirms that 
( ) 1f p′ < : 
          ( )( ) 1 11
vqf p
q
γγ
α
′ = − − <
−
. (15) 
Therefore, the fixed point is stable if ( ) 1f p′ > − , that is, if 
          ( )( )2 1vq q γ α γ< − − . (16) 
With naïve expectations, f is strictly monotonically decreasing: the higher is 1etp − , the higher 
is 1tq −  and the lower is 1
e
t tp p− = . The system is attracted either to the fixed point (where 
1vq q α< − ) or to a period-two cycle (where 1vq q α> − ). Fig. 2(a), based on 1.5α =  and 
1γ = , shows the map f corresponding to Fig. 1: the fixed point is repelling and the system is 
attracted to the depicted period-two cycle.2 With adaptive price expectations, the possible 
long-term behaviors are considerably enriched. Fig. 2(b), based on 1.075α =  and 0.4γ = , 
                                               
2
 All diagrams and simulations assume 1fq = , 0.1r = , 1000N =  and 5000E = . All simulations assume 
0 0.99
ep p= . 
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7 
illustrates a period-three cycle, the hallmark of complex dynamics. Fig. 3(a), based on 
1.1α = , shows the impact of the expectations adjustment speed, γ, on the long-term behavior 
of expected price. The fixed point is stable for sufficiently slow speeds. As γ  increases 
through 0.24bifγ ≅ , where ( ) 1f p′ = − , a sequence of period-doubling bifurcations occurs. 
For speeds between 0.381Sγ ≅  and 0.564Eγ ≅ , intervals of chaos (a positive Lyapunov 
exponent in Fig. 3(b)) and of order (a negative Lyapunov exponent) are intermingled. 
Increasing γ  above Eγ  gives rise to a sequence of period-halving (period-doubling 
reversed), until a stable period-two cycle is generated at 0.712γ ≅ . As γ  increases towards 
1, the amplitude of the period-two cycle increases.  
It should be emphasized that our model involves normal assumptions about costs and 
demand and that, with the assumption of unconstrained borrowing, it constitutes a standard 
cobweb model. The map f belongs to the class of difference equations analyzed by Hommes 
(1994) involving adaptive expectations and non-linear but monotonic demand and supply.3 
As 0fq → , the map f tends to a form similar to that analyzed by Onozaki et al. (2000), who 
assume naïve expectations but cautious adjustment to the output that maximizes expected 
profit. But what these studies ignore is whether the long-term behaviors implied by the 
models are consistent with the long-run financial viability of producers. When this issue is 
                                               
3
 For this class, the difference equations are differentiable and possess a first derivative less than 1. As a 
specific case, Hommes explores the properties of a map derived from an ‘S-shaped’ supply curve and a linear 
demand function. His map has similar properties to our map f (it has two critical points for some 0 1γ< <  and 
is strictly decreasing at 1γ = ) and the qualitative properties of the dynamics are substantially identical. A 
crucial difference is that, since Hommes normalizes prices by using the inflection point of his supply curve as 
the new origin, his model does not permit an evaluation of profitability. 
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8 
addressed, it becomes evident that there is a fundamental problem with standard cobweb 
models. 
For our model, as shown in Fig. 3(c), long-run average profit declines monotonically as 
the speed γ increases beyond bifγ . For 0.257piγ γ> ≅ , average losses are incurred, and they 
increase rapidly as γ increases towards the case of naïve expectations. Negative long-run 
average profits set off alarm bells suggesting non-viability. However, the question of long-
run viability cannot be settled conclusively by examining average profits: in general, 
negative average profits are neither necessary nor sufficient for financial crises to occur.  
To determine whether financial crises occur, we need to consider explicitly the behaviors 
of net borrowing and of financial wealth. We define bγ  as the expectations adjustment speed 
below which producers are always able to finance internally their desired input acquisitions 
and never have recourse to borrowing. We define fcγ  as the speed below which financial 
crises do not occur, where, provisionally, we define a financial crisis as arising when the 
representative firm’s debt is increasing period after period. Since a financial crisis can only 
arise as a result of borrowing, fc bγ γ≥ . In fact, with unconstrained borrowing, financial 
crises occur sooner or later (i.e., fc bγ γ= ). The latter critical speed depends inter alia on the 
representative producer’s initial financial wealth. Assuming that the latter is just sufficient to 
cover the cost of producing the initial expected profit maximizing output (i.e., 
( )0 0 fF q q α= −  where ( ) ( )1 10 0efq q p α ψ−= + ), simulations show that 0.277fc bγ γ= ≅  for the 
parameters on which Fig. 3 is based. Note well that fc b piγ γ γ= > . That is, there is a range of 
speeds for which, even though average profit is negative, the representative firm does not 
borrow and cannot go bankrupt. In this case, the production losses are being subsidized by 
the receipt of positive net interest. Fig. 4 shows the impact on profitability and on the 
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9 
occurrence of financial crises of varying both the speed γ  and the cost parameter α . Region 
I corresponds to parameter combinations that result in stationarity with profit pi . In Region 
II, average profit is positive but below the stationary profit. In Region III, average profit is 
negative but firms do not borrow (and cannot go bankrupt). The boundary between Regions 
III and IV shows for each α  the corresponding speed bγ  below which firms never borrow. 
In Region IV, firms do borrow and, sooner or later, they go bankrupt. From Fig. 4, for most 
parameter combinations for which the model exhibits complex behavior, firms engage in 
borrowing and, with no constraints on that borrowing, they go bankrupt.  
The incidence of financial crises cannot simply be eliminated by a ceteris paribus 
increase in demand: increasing E (or reducing N) increases the intercept of the map f and is a 
destabilizing force. With cyclical or chaotic system behavior, average profit is less than the 
stationary profit, and fluctuations increase the likelihood of financial crises. Similarly, 
assuming a demand curve with a constant elasticity other than 1−  does not alter our 
conclusions in any fundamental way.4  
Before considering the nature and implications of borrowing constraints, we make two 
historical observations. First, whereas the notion of negative average pure profits over the 
long run may be disquieting to those brought up on the standard neoclassical theory of a 
                                               
4
 Extending the model to incorporate the distribution of part of the representative firm’s income to shareholders 
would complicate further the relationships between average profits, borrowing and the occurrence of 
bankruptcies. The greater the proportion of income that is distributed, the lower the critical speeds at and above 
which borrowing and financial crises occur. With such distribution, there can be a range of speeds for which 
firms borrow regularly without going bankrupt (i.e., b fcγ γ<  for a given α ). Furthermore, it is possible that 
the distribution of earnings may be sufficiently high that bankruptcies occur even though long-run average 
profit is positive (i.e., fc piγ γ<  for a given α ). 
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perfectly competitive industry, it would not have been troublesome to Knight. In his classic 
work, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, he advanced his strongly-held belief that “business as a 
whole suffers a loss” (1971, 365): he argued that entrepreneurs, motivated by the prospect of 
profits, actually realize negative pure profits on average, and they sustain this essentially 
through foregoing some of the opportunity costs on those financial or physical resources that 
they themselves supply to their businesses. Second, in certain respects, our challenge to 
standard non-linear cobweb models echoes a largely ignored challenge to the linear cobweb 
model by Buchanan in 1939. He argued that “neither perpetual fluctuation at a given 
amplitude nor expanding fluctuation is theoretically possible if the supply curve is a 
competitive supply curve as most writers apparently had in mind in their exposition of the 
doctrine” since “losses will inevitably exceed profits” (80-81).5 He notes: “On the special 
assumption that there is always a group of new producers willing to rush in and dissipate 
their capitals with each swing of the cycle, the theorem may perhaps be valid” (81). 
4. Constrained Borrowing 
Denoting the representative producer’s financial capital fund at the beginning of period t 
by tK , where this comprises both own financial wealth and the maximum that the producer 
could borrow, the financial capital constraint on output is 
          
,v t tq K
α ≤ . (17) 
Maximizing expected profit subject to (17) requires 
          ( ) ( ){ }1 1 1, min ;et f v t f t tq q q q p Kα αψ−= + = +  (18) 
                                               
5
 In contrast to our model, Buchanan’s analysis encompasses two alternative interpretations of the industry 
supply curve, neither of which corresponds to the case of Ricardian increasing costs. 
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where ( ) ( )1 1ef tq p α ψ−+  is the output that would maximize expected profit in the absence of a 
financial constraint (see (13)) and 1/f tq K α+  is the maximum output consistent with the 
financial constraint.  
To accommodate the entry of a new cohort of producers to replace those that go bankrupt, 
it is necessary to specify precisely when firms are deemed bankrupt and what the financial 
position of entrants is. Our banks follow a simple rule: a firm is declared bankrupt if and 
only if it has a financial debt that is not diminishing. That is, the representative producer is 
deemed to be bankrupt at the beginning of period t iff 
          1 0t tF F −≤ < . (19) 
We assume that where durable assets are sold to a new producer cohort, the purchase 
exhausts the funds of the representative entrant so that there is no own financial capital left 
for acquiring additional inputs (i.e., 0tF =  for a firm entering at the beginning of period t). 
The latter seems the least arbitrary assumption, and it implies at least that new firms get off 
to a good start since each produces fq  and receives the maximum profit in its first period. 
The dynamical system is depicted in Fig. 5. The financial capital fund tK , which 
necessarily depends on own financial wealth tF , may or may not depend also on the value of 
the durable asset, tV . Where tK  depends directly only on tF , then 
e
tp  depends on 1
e
tp −  and 
on 1tF − ; and tF  depends on 1
e
tp −  and on 1tF − . Given an initial expected price 0
ep  and an 
initial financial wealth 0F , the future time paths of 
e
tp , tK , tq , tB , tp , tpi , ty  and tF  are 
determined uniquely; with an appropriate initial condition, the time path of tV  can be 
determined from that of tpi .  
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The system’s behavior differs from the case of unconstrained borrowing if and only if the 
financial capital constraint (17) impacts on the behavior of the representative producer. Since 
the constraint is never binding for parameter combinations in Regions I, II and III in Fig. 4, 
the  system’s dynamical behavior is necessarily the same as for the map f for unconstrained 
borrowing. Therefore, the interesting ( ),γ α  combinations are those in Region IV. For the 
latter Region, the decomposition that occurs with unconstrained borrowing breaks down. 
Since the constraint (17) shifts over time as financial wealth changes, the system’s dynamical 
behavior is considerably more complicated than for unconstrained borrowing.  
4.1 Pure Internal Finance 
Suppose initially that producers must rely exclusively on their own financial capital. With 
pure internal finance, 
          0t tK F= ≥ . (20) 
This excludes any possibility of bankruptcy: a firm that cannot borrow never falls into debt. 
Fig. 6, based on 1.1α =  to permit comparisons with Fig. 3, shows the behaviors of expected 
price and of long-run average profit. Comparing pure internal finance with unconstrained 
borrowing for bγ γ> , the long-run behavior of expected price is not overtly very different. 
Over the chaotic region, the behavior of expected price appears rather more ‘noisy’ in Fig. 6, 
but the ranges of variation at any speed are similar. However, the crucial difference is not 
evident from the bifurcation diagrams. Whereas recurrent financial crises are inevitable with 
unconstrained borrowing for bγ γ> , bankruptcies cannot occur with pure internal finance, 
notwithstanding the negative average profits. For example, for naïve expectations, the 
period-two cycle with unconstrained borrowing involves a firm lifetime of just two periods; 
in contrast, the period-two cycle with pure internal finance is consistent with the continuing 
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survival of firms. For all ( ),γ α  combinations in Region IV in Fig. 4, pure internal finance 
involves survival with negative average profits. 
4.2 Credit Rationing 
Typically, firms are able to borrow but their ability to do so is constrained. Banks, facing 
the risk that a borrower may fail to repay the interest and the principal, ration credit. Lending 
to producers in a wide variety of industries and facing asymmetric information, our banks 
follow behavioral rules that discriminate between prospective borrowers according to their 
balance sheets.6  
A natural case to consider first is that where the producers’ durable asset L provides 
collateral for loans. Specifically, suppose that a bank is prepared to lend a producer up to a 
limit of ( )1tV r+ . Provided that the value of L does not fall, the proceeds from its sale 
would cover both the principal and the interest, protecting the bank against default.7 
However, in our model, this credit constraint results in the same dynamical behavior as for 
pure internal finance. The explanation is that, for those parameter combinations for which 
the firms’ own financial capital is insufficient to finance desired input acquisition (i.e., for 
Region IV in Fig. 4), long-run average profits are negative; according to (11), the durable 
asset is effectively worthless (i.e., 0tV ≅ ) and cannot be used as collateral for a loan. 
A more interesting possibility is that banks discriminate between producers according to 
their financial wealth levels. This would be equivalent to basing the limit on the own 
                                               
6
 In their macro-analysis of business cycles, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) examine the significance of the 
creditworthiness of borrowers being dependent on their net worth.  
7
 In their analysis of credit cycles, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997, 218) invoke a similar borrowing constraint. In 
their rational expectations model, agents have perfect foresight of future durable asset prices.  
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financial capital that producers risk in production, for example, where banks are prepared to 
‘match’ the own funds invested by borrowers. Following Day (1967, 1994) and Day et al. 
(1974), suppose that banks are willing to lend up to a multiple θ  of a producer’s own 
financial capital, where 0θ >  reflects the degree of cautiousness of the banking community.8 
The representative producer’s financial capital fund, including possible borrowed funds, is 
then 
          
( )1 0
0 0
t t
t
t
F for F
K for F
θ + ≥
= 	
<

. (21) 
Note well that, since a firm in debt cannot borrow, the simple bankruptcy rule (19), 
plausible for an individual bank that lacks information about the industry, turns out to be a 
sensible one for the banking community as a whole. To see this, suppose that at the outset of 
period ( )1t − , the representative firm was in financial debt. Unable to borrow, it produced 
fq . With each firm supplying fq  to the market, each received the maximum profit pi

. A 
failure to make any positive contribution to paying off its debt (i.e., 1 0t tF F −≤ < ) is 
equivalent to 1tr Fpi −≤

. Since the receipt of the maximum profit pi  in the previous period 
made no contribution to paying off the debt, the firm’s financial position is irretrievable: if it 
continued in production, its debt would inexorably deteriorate period after period if 
1 0t tF F −< <  and would remain the same in the (fluke) case in which 1 0t tF F −= < . Thus, by 
deeming firms to be bankrupt if they have made no contribution to paying off their debts, 
banks are rationally cutting their losses. In contrast, if firms did make some contribution over 
the previous period to paying off their debts (i.e., 1tr Fpi −> ), it would not pay banks to 
                                               
8
 Fixing limits to loans is a crucial component of banks’ portfolio management. See Cohen and Hammer (1972) 
and Walker (1997). 
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deem them to be bankrupt. Firms would continue to reduce the debts period by period until 
they are cleared.9    
Compared with pure internal finance (which would correspond to 0θ = ), the ability to 
borrow results in much greater system volatility for bγ γ> . Fig. 7, based on 1.1α = , shows 
the behaviors of expected price and of long-run average profit for 4θ = . A crude story 
would be as follows. A low output in period t results both in a high price and in a high profit. 
In turn, the high price results in a high expected price. Furthermore, the high profit enhances 
the producers’ ability to borrow. The resulting high output in period ( )1t +  gives rise to a 
loss. If this loss results in the producer being in debt, output in period ( )2t +  is at its 
minimum level, with price and profit at their highest levels. This continues until the debt is 
cleared. That the ability to borrow can result in sustained periods of debt and of low outputs 
lies behind another striking feature of Fig. 7, namely, that, for 4θ = , long-run average 
profits are positive. This particular increase in average profits (compared to pure internal 
finance and a fortiori to the case of unlimited borrowing) is acquired without much risk to 
banks, since, for 4θ =  and for the assumed cost structure ( 1.1α = ), financial crises occur 
only for a very few isolated speeds.  
Fig. 8 shows the impact of γ  and of α  on borrowing, profitability and bankruptcy for 
selected values of the credit rationing parameter θ . For each ( ), ,θ γ α  combination, average 
profits were calculated and the incidences of borrowing and bankruptcy were identified for 
                                               
9
 Since rpi  is the maximum conceivable value for L, our bankruptcy condition implies that a bankrupt firm’s 
total wealth cannot be positive. In other words, our bankruptcy condition is equivalent to postulating that the 
representative firm is deemed bankrupt if its (hypothetically) receiving the discounted present value of the 
future infinite stream of the maximum possible profits would not result in a positive total wealth. 
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501 2000t≤ ≤ . The interpretations of the colors are shown in Table 1.10 For example, dark 
green signifies that producers borrowed at least once, that long-run average profit was 
negative but that no bankruptcies occurred. Note first the relationship between Fig. 8 and 
Fig. 4. For ( ),γ α  combinations in Regions I, II and III in Fig. 4, producers rely solely on 
internal finance and cannot go bankrupt. Therefore, Regions I, II and III appear, respectively, 
as white, light blue and dark blue in Fig. 8 (the level of θ  being irrelevant). The borrowing 
constraint only impacts ( ),γ α  combinations in Region IV. As seen above, for pure internal 
finance ( 0θ = ), losses are incurred for Region IV, so the latter would be dark blue. In Fig. 
8(a), where banks are prepared just to match a borrower’s own funds ( 1θ = ), firms take 
advantage of the opportunity to borrow, long-run average profits are negative but 
bankruptcies never occur. Increasing θ  can increase average profitability but at a cost of a 
greater risk of financial crises. Thus, in Fig. 8(b) where 4θ = , the beneficial impact of the 
higher θ  is manifested in the light green areas, indicating positive average profits; the 
hazards are reflected in the incidences of bankruptcies signified by the purple and red areas. 
Further increases in θ  increase the likelihood of financial crises. Where bankruptcies are 
avoided, higher average profits are accompanied by increased variability of profits and 
possibly by the representative producer being frequently in debt. For 10θ =  in Fig. 8(c), the 
red areas confirm the increased frequency of bankruptcies, while the yellow areas signify 
that, for some ( ),γ α  combinations, firms not only survive but also earn long-run average 
profits above the stationary profit.11 Barely perceptible incidences of orange mean that it is 
                                               
10
 The colors are visible in the online version. 
11
 This is consistent with Huang (1995), who shows that, under certain circumstances, ‘cautious’ responses by 
firms to fluctuating prices may result in long-run average profit above the stationary profit. Such responses 
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possible for bankruptcies to occur even though average profits exceed the stationary profit. 
For yet more lax credit limits, borrowing almost invariably results in bankruptcy. As Section 
3 confirmed, for unconstrained borrowing, all ( ),γ α  combinations in Region 4 would be 
red, signifying borrowing leading to losses and to bankruptcy.  
5. Some Concluding Comments 
In reality, producers are constrained in their ability to borrow. In reality, producers go 
bankrupt. Our borrowing constraints and our bankruptcy condition presuppose that the 
banking community follows very simple behavioral rules. Our model could be extended by 
allowing credit limits to depend on the history of repayment defaults in this industry; by 
assuming that the rate of interest depends on the amount borrowed; or by introducing 
heterogeneity in the financial wealth levels of producers. Such amendments would surely 
reinforce our central conclusion: industry performance (in terms both of profitability and of 
the incidence of bankruptcies) is highly sensitive to the nature and degree of credit 
restrictions. 
However simple the behavioral rules of our banks, they are certainly more plausible than 
the assumption (implicit in standard cobweb models) that banks are prepared to lend any 
amount to a producer, even to one that is falling further and further into debt. An implication 
of our model, which involves standard assumptions about costs and demand, is that 
unconstrained borrowing results in bankruptcies. To put our challenge to the standard non-
linear cobweb model bluntly, a model designed to explain how prices and quantities can 
                                                                                                                                                 
involve upper bounds on the growth rates of output, which Huang suggests might be attributable to “capacity 
constraints, financial constraints and cautious response to price uncertainty by firms” (261).  
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fluctuate endogenously is methodologically unsatisfactory if is inconsistent with the survival 
of producers for precisely those parameters that result in complex dynamical behavior. 
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 Borrowing  Average Profit 
(av.) 
Bankruptcy 
white  .av pi=   
light blue  0 .av pi≤ <   
dark blue  . 0av <   
yellow  .av pi≥   
light green  0 .av pi≤ <   
dark green  . 0av <   
orange  .av pi≥   
purple  0 .av pi≤ <   
red  . 0av <   
 
Table 1 
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The impact of the expectations adjustment speed, 0.2 1γ≤ ≤ , and of the cost 
parameter, 1.1 1.6α≤ ≤ , on long-run profitability, borrowing and bankruptcy for 
different values of the credit rationing parameter θ . White signifies stationarity; light 
blue signifies no borrowing and a positive average profit below the stationary profit; 
dark blue signifies no borrowing and a negative average profit; yellow signifies 
borrowing (but no bankruptcies) with an average profit above the stationary profit; 
light green signifies borrowing (but no bankruptcies) with a positive average profit 
below the stationary profit; dark green signifies borrowing (but no bankruptcies) with 
a negative average profit; orange signifies an average profit above the stationary profit 
but with bankruptcies; purple signifies a positive average profit below the stationary 
profit but with bankruptcies; red signifies a negative average profit with bankruptcies. 
(a) 1θ = (b) 4θ = (c) 10θ =
cost parameter
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